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ABSTRACT. We model electoral competition between two parties in a
winner-take-all election. Parties choose strategically ﬁrst their platforms
and then their campaign spending under aggregate uncertainty about vot-
ers’ preferences. We use the model to examine why campaign spending
in the United States has increased at the same time that politics has be-
come more polarized. We ﬁnd that the popular explanation – better tar-
geting of campaign spending – is not a likely explanation. While better
targeting does lead to greater spending, it leads to less polarization. In-
stead we argue that the likely explanation is that voters preferences have
become more volatile. This will both raise campaign spending and in-
crease polarization. At the same time it is consistent with the observation
that voters have become less committed to the two parties.
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1. INTRODUCTION
High turnout in large elections or the “non voter paradox” has been con-
sidered a major problem for the modelling of voters as instrumentally ra-
tional agents at least since Downs [3]. While voting costs may be low, the
probability of affecting the outcome of the election is so tiny in a large elec-
tion that even very small costs should deter any individual motivated solely
by the desire to inﬂuence the election result from going to vote. The game-
theoretic analysis of Palfrey and Rosenthal [12], built on earlier work by
Ledyard [6], conﬁrms Downs’s intuition: in large elections, Nash equilib-
rium voter turnout is extremely low, provided that voters are somewhat un-
certain about the preferences or voting inclination of others. This is clearly
at odds with regularly observed large turnouts. That is, there must be some-
thing more than the simple desire to inﬂuence the election result that brings
people to the voting booth on election day. In fact, political parties spend
considerable money and effort to encourage people to vote. This includes
such things as decreasing the direct cost of voting – for example by pro-
viding volunteers who drive voters to the polls; decreasing the cost of ac-
quiring information – for example by publicizing attractive aspects of their
platforms and candidates and negative aspects of their rivals; increasing the
cost of not voting – for example via social sanctions; and by signaling the
closeness and importance of the election race. By the same token, we may
expect political parties to take into account the expected cost of bring voters
to the booth when formulating electoral platforms.
In this paper, we model electoral competition as a two-stage game. In the
ﬁrst stage, two parties (with both an ideological and an ofﬁce motivation)
strategically choose their platforms. In the second stage, parties decide how
much to spend on the campaign. Turnout for each party is a function of
campaign spending as well as voters’ bias in favor of one or the other party.
We treat party bias as being independent of parties’ platforms and subject to
aggregate shocks. We can think of party bias as reﬂecting voters’ concerns
for issues that are “symbolic” rather than related to policy decisions. We
consider campaign spending as having an impact on turnout via mobiliza-
tion of voters. We pay special attention to the effectiveness of campaign
targeting. If the targeting ability of parties is low, then campaign spending
partially misﬁres, by mobilizing voters in favor of the other party; if the tar-
geting ability of parties is high, each party’s spending mobilizes only voters
in favor of that party.
We use the model to explore three stylized facts about electoral politics
in the United States.
• The two parties have become increasingly polarized.
• Campaign spending has increased substantially.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 2
• Voters have become less committed to the two parties.
Poole and Rosenthal [13] and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal [9] pro-
vide some evidence on polarization, based on the average distance between
Democratic and Republican members of Congress on a liberal-conservative
scale. They ﬁnd that polarization has been sharply increasing since around
1980, after a long period of decline started around 1900.
With respect to campaign spending, and more generally the campaign
effort of political parties and allied interest groups, an interesting indirect
source is the percentage of respondents in public opinion studies contacted
by political parties in elections. National Election Studies [10] (Tables
6C.1a, 6C.1b and 6C.1c), provides evidence of a sharp increase in the per-
centage of respondents contacted by either party since 1990.
Finally, with respect to the commitment of voters to the two parties, party
afﬁliation has fallen enormously since 1960. According to some observers,
the fraction of voters who register as neither Democrat nor Republican has
gone from 1.6 in 1960 to 21.7 in 2004 (see [2], p. 11). The party iden-
tiﬁcation data from the National Election Studies [10] (Tables 2A.1, 2A.2
and 2A.3) is consistent with this view. The percentage of voters who de-
clare themselves as independent or leaning independent has gone from 25
in 1960 to 37 in 2002.
We consider two possible explanations of these facts. First, commenta-
tors have also suggested that the reason for both the increased polarization
and campaign spending is because skilled political operatives using sophis-
ticated statistical tools, and purchasing advertising in local markets are bet-
ter able to target particular voters (see e.g. [15]). However, in our model
improved targeting may indeed lead to an increase in campaign spending –
but it also leads to a reduction in polarization. The reason for the reduction
in polarization is that, in deciding their policy platforms in the ﬁrst stage
of the game, parties anticipate an increase in campaign costs in the second
stage as a result of better targeting. Polarized platforms become too costly.
The second explanation – and our favored one – is that voters prefer-
ences have become more volatile. By increased volatility, we mean larger
aggregate shocks to party bias. We show in our model that increase in
volatility leads to both an increase in campaign spending and an increase
in polarization. Moreover, it also provides an explanation of the decreasing
commitment of voters to the two parties: a voter who is relatively near the
middle will have little reason to afﬁliate with a particular party since it will
be difﬁcult for her to predict which party she would prefer.
The effect of volatility on polarization is very intuitive. Greater volatil-
ity means that the results of elections are less certain. Consequently, thePOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 3
parties have less reason to please the center voters, and are free to move to-
wards their own extreme preferences. The effect of volatility on campaign
spending is less intuitive. We can decompose it in two effects. First, hold-
ing ﬁxed the party positions, increasing volatility unambiguously lowers
spending. However, increasing volatility also increases polarization in the
ﬁrst stage of the game. That means that in the second stage game, the stakes
are higher – it is better to win and worse to lose. That increases the marginal
beneﬁt of spending. So there are two offsetting effects, and the comparative
static theorem shows that the increased spending dominates once electoral
uncertainty is big enough.
Recently, Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky [4] have devoted some attention
to the issue of buying votes using different procedures. In their setup, cam-
paign expenditure is more effective and less is spent if the parties can buy
binding commitments to vote (“up front vote buying”). In comparison, in
our setup voters cannot make binding commitments with parties, but parties
have an (imperfect) ability to target their spending to favorable voters.
2. THE MODEL
We model a winner-take-all election between two parties, D and R. The
election takes place in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the two parties simulta-
neously choose binding policy platforms d and 1−r, which are elements of
the policy space [0,1]. In the second stage, observing the policy platforms
of the other party, they simultaneously choose their campaign efforts D and
R, which are elements of the effort space [0,1].
Each party has an “ofﬁce motivation” for winning the election, which we
representasanamountG≥0forwinningtheelection. Eachpartyalsocares
about the policy p implemented by the winning party, which we represented
by g(p),g(1− p) for D and R respectively. Finally, the campaign effort of
a party E = D,R has a cost c(E). Overall, party D and party R’s payoffs are
VD =

G+g(d)−c(D) if party D wins




G+g(r)−c(R) if party R wins
g(1−d)−c(R) if party D wins .
We assume that the functions g,c are decreasing and increasing respec-
tively, and have the isoelastic forms
g(p) =

(1/2− p)b if p ∈ [0,1/2]
−(p−1/2)b if p ∈ (1/2,1]
c(E) = dE1+gPOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 4
for b ∈ (0,1] and d > 0 and g ≥ 0. Note that in this formulation, parties
prefer more extreme positions.
The policy motivation function g is therefore strictly decreasing on [0,1]
and concave and continuously differentiable on [0,1/2). This means that
party D and party R’s ideal points in the policy space are, respectively, 0
and 1. Observe that b = 1 represents the familiar Euclidean policy prefer-
ences, while b near zero represents parties that are (almost) purely ofﬁce-
motivated. Notice also that g(p) = −g(1− p); this means that the sum of
the payoffs of the two parties is constant regardless of who wins the elec-
tion.
The outcome of the election is determined by the voters, of whom there
is a continuum uniformly distributed on the unit interval and indexed by
v ∈ [0,1]. Voters’ preferences are determined jointly by party positions and
by “party identiﬁcation,” as modelled by Lindbeck and Weibull [7, 8] and
others. As described below, voters will not necessarily turn out to vote, so
the determinant of the election is the fraction that favor either party and turn
out to vote.
Policy preferences of voters are Euclidean with their ideal point deter-
mined by their index v. In addition to their policy preferences, voters have
an idiosyncratic party bias bv in favor of D and an aggregate party bias b,
also in favor of D. So voter v will favor party D if
−|v−d|+bv+b > −|v−(1−r)|
and will favor party R if the inequality is reversed.
We assume that b is randomly distributed according to the distribution F
with twice continuously differentiable density f and support [−a,a], and
that bv isuniformly distributedwithsupport [−1−a,1+a], where a≥1/4.
The realization of b is is not known to parties until after they propose their
policy position and carry out their campaign spending. Notice that ais a
measure of the volatility of voter preferences.
Voters do not necessarily show up to vote for the party they favor. Rather,
the numbers that show up are determined by the effort made by each party
to turn out the vote. A fraction tD+(1−t)R of voters favoring party D and
a fraction tR+(1−t)D of voters favoring party R show up to vote for the
parties they favor, while the other voters abstain. The parameter t ∈ (1/2,1]
represents the accuracy of campaign targeting. If t = 1, then D,R represent
how many (what fraction) of voters each party chooses to turn out; as we
have assumed, the cost of increasing turnout c exhibits diminishing returns
to scale, it is increasingly difﬁcult to persuade voters favoring either party
to show up to vote. If t < 1, some of the campaign spending of each party
misﬁres, by mobilizing voters in favor of the other party. We can think of
campaign effort as reducing the cost of showing up for voters or as attachingPOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 5
some “symbolic value” to the act of voting.1 The election is won by the
party with more votes.
To guarantee concavity of the objective function of parties with respect
to campaign spending, we assume that the density f does not decrease too




for any z in the support of F. When F is uniform this is always satisﬁed. To
avoid dealing with corner cases, we assume that the marginal cost of effort
d is sufﬁciently high that neither party is inclined to get all the favorable
voters to vote
(1+g)d ≥ (1+a)(2t −1)(2−b+G/2)sup
z
f(z).
We also assume that g, the curvature of the cost of effort, and b, the curva-















From the model, we can work out the probability that each party wins and
voter turnout as a function of the policy platforms and campaign spending.











Aggregate voter turnout is
(D+R)/2+(D−R)(2t −1)(b+d−d2−r+r2)/(2+2a).
All proofs may be found in the Appendix. In the expression for the prob-
ability of D winning, the ﬁrst term in the argument of the distribution func-
tion
−d+d2+r−r2
1Note that the cost depends upon the fraction rather than the absolute number; so if a
party has very few favorable voters, it is just as costly to turn out half of them as if the
party has a lot of favorable voters. This assumption may make more sense when dealing
with national parties with geographically dispersed constituencies.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 6
represents the inﬂuence of policy platforms, while the second term
−(1+a)(2t −1)(D−R)/(D+R)
represents the inﬂuence of campaign spending on the election outcome. (If
D = R = 0, we assume that each party has a positive probability of winning
the election.) Campaign spending has potentially at least three roles: (1)
Move party sympathizers to effectively vote; (2) Persuade undecided voters
or voters leaning to the other party of the merits of one party’s policies; (3)
Dissuade sympathizers of the other party to vote. We have focused on the
“mobilization”aspectofcampaignspendingratherthanonthe“persuasion”
or “vote suppression” aspects.
Given the probabilities of winning, we can work out the second stage
equilibrium campaign spending given policy platforms.
Theorem 3.2. If g(d)+g(r)+G < 0, then the unique second stage Nash
choice of campaign spending is D = R = 0. If g(d)+g(r)+G ≥ 0 both






4. THE UNIFORM/SYMMETRIC CASE
As we have seen, campaign spending by the two parties is equal even if
F is asymmetric – provided only that it does not decrease too rapidly. We
will now focus on the symmetric case in which F is actually uniform on
[−a,a]. In this case we can solve to ﬁnd the ﬁrst stage equilibrium, which
is unique and symmetric. For notational simplicity, we let h = 1/2a denote
the height of the density function.
Theorem 4.1. If F is uniform on [−a,a], there is a unique equilibrium, it










+(2g(p∗)+G)h(1−2p∗) = 0. (4.1)
The solution to this equation has 0 < p∗ < 1/2.
5. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In this section we perform some comparative static exercises on the uni-
form symmetric case described in the previous section.
Theorem 5.1. If F is uniform on [−a,a], the equilibrium policy position p∗
is independent of d, increasing in G,t and decreasing in a,g. EquilibriumPOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 7















This result provides unambiguous predictions with respect to the effects
of the parameter of the model on polarization (1/2− p∗). In particular, an
increase in the accuracy of campaign targeting reduces polarization, and an
increase in electoral uncertainty increases polarization. The effect of elec-
toral uncertainty on polarization is quite intuitive. Indeed, previous liter-
ature at least since the work of Wittman [16] and Calvert [1] has shown
that increased electoral uncertainty can dampen the incentive of policy-
motivated parties to moderate their electoral platforms. Per contra, our
result on the effect of targeting accuracy on polarization is novel. Intu-
itively, if parties’ platforms were to stay constant, an increase in targeting
accuracy would lead to an increase in campaign costs in the second stage of
the model. This reduces the incentive for parties to diverge in the ﬁrst stage
of the model.
The effects of the parameters of the model on campaign spending (and
thus on turnout) are not clear cut. This is because parties set their policy
choices anticipating the campaign stage of the electoral game. Thus, the
direct effect of the underlying parameters on campaign spending may be
undone by indirect effects through policy choices. For instance, from equa-
tion 7.6, we can see that holding policy choices constant, an increase in the
accuracy of campaign spending increases spending. However, increased ac-
curacy also reduces polarization, thereby reducing the incentive to invest in
campaigning. Similarly, an increase in electoral uncertainty has a negative
direct effect on campaign spending but a positive indirect effect.
From equation 7.6, we expect indirect effects to be particularly strong if
there is no ofﬁce motivation (G = 0) or ofﬁce motivation is relatively small.
Theorem 5.1 provides some comparative statics results with respect to cam-
paign spending for the case G = 0. We obtain that the net effect of greater
accuracyintargetingovercampaignspendingispositiveifcampaignspend-
ing is not very accurate to begin with (t near 1/2), or if electoral uncertainty
is large and the elasticity of campaign costs 1+g is large. Similarly, manip-
ulating the quadratic condition for ¶E∗/¶a in Theorem 5.1, we get that the
net effect of larger electoral uncertainty over campaign spending is negativePOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 8

















































ing is positive if electoral uncertainty is large, or if campaign spending is
accurate and g is small.
For instance, under the usual (but extreme) assumptions of Euclidean
preferences (b = 1) and linear costs (g = 0), if G = 0 then the net effect
of greater accuracy in targeting over campaign spending is positive if t <
1/2+2a/(3+3a), and the net effect of greater electoral uncertainty over
campaign spending is positive if t > 2/3.
6. CONCLUSION
Our goal has been to understand why campaign spending has increased at
the same time that politics has become more polarized. Theorem 5.1 shows
us that an improvement in targeting alone is not enough to explain both
trends. Improving targeting t may lead to an increase in campaign spending
(particularly if G is not small) but it also leads to a reduction in polarization.
That is, with better targeting parties compete more both by spending more
and increasing attention given to the the median voter, that is by being less
polarizing.
Ontheotherhand, anincreaseinathevolatilityofvoterpreferencesdoes
lead both to an increase in campaign spending (at least if a is big enough),
and also to an increase in polarization. As we noted, it is also potentially
an explanation for the increasing lack of party afﬁliation. We treat ofﬁce
motivationGasexogenous; butitmayverywellbethatasfewervotershave
a party afﬁliation, parties fall into the hands of extremists, which are more
motivated by policy considerations than by holding ofﬁce – this reinforces
the effect that is in the model.
In the model we ignore the possibility of campaign contribution limits
being actually binding.2 In fact, the model suggests a way to limit he waste
2For instance, referring to the 2004 Congressional election, Jacobson [5] states that the
ﬂow of campaign funds has been much less determined by the campaign reform act of
2002 than by the usual strategic considerations.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 9
associatedwithcostlycampaigninginthecontextofpolarizedpolitics. Tax-
ing campaign contributions and money spent by advocacy groups would be
equivalent in our model to raising d. Note that party positions are indepen-
dent of d (Theorem 5.1). Moreover, using equation 7.6, it is easy to see that
campaign costs c(E) remain constant if d changes. This is because changes
in d are completely offset in equilibrium by changes in campaign effort.
Thus, taxing campaign contributions simply takes resources away from a
wasteful activity.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 10
7. APPENDIX











Aggregate voter turnout is
(D+R)/2+(D−R)(2t −1)(b+d−d2−r+r2)/(2+2a).
Proof. From the preceding assumptions, if d ≤ 1−r,






2+2a if 0 ≤ v ≤ d
1
2 + 1−r+d+b−2v
2+2a if d ≤ v ≤ 1−r
1
2 + r−1+d+b
2+2a if 1−r ≤ v ≤ 1
.

















































Similar calculations show that the same expression applies in case d >1−r.





































This implies the overall probability that D wins is the expression above.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 11


















which simpliﬁes to the expression above. 
Theorem. 3.2 If g(d)+g(r)+G < 0, then the unique second stage Nash
choice of campaign spending is D = R = 0. If g(d)+g(r)+G ≥ 0 both






Proof. Suppose that parties have chosen their policy platforms in the ﬁrst
stage of the game and consider their choice of campaign spending in the
second stage. Let the parties be i = D,R, and let pi = d,r and Ei = D,R.
























of campaign spending is D = R = 0, as the payoff of winning the election
will not be positive. Now consider the case in which g(d)+g(r)+G>0 (as
will hold in the subgame perfect equilibrium analyzed in the next section).
It is easy to show that there is no Nash equilibrium in which either one or
the two parties do not spend any positive amount. The following ﬁrst order







(Corner solutions in which either party chooses effort level 1 are ruled out
by our lower bound on c0(1).)POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 12






which implies c0(D)/R = c0(R)/D or Dc0(D) = Rc0(R). Since xc0(x)
is strictly increasing in x, it follows that D = R. Using D = R = E∗ and
simplifying the previous equation we get 7.2.
We want to check that the second order condition holds for both par-
ties so that in fact we have found the (unique) Nash equilibrium choice of
campaign spending for any given pair d,r. The second derivative of the
objective function of party D is
− f (z)(1+a)(2t −1)(k)(4R)(D+R)−3
+ f0(z)(1+a)2(2t −1)2(k)(4R2)(D+R)−4−c00(D)
where
z = −d+d2+r−r2−(1+a)(2t −1)(D−R)/(D+R)
and
k = g(d)+g(r)+G.




Since −f0(z)/f(z) ≤ 1/[(1+a)(2t −1)] by assumption, we get that
f(z)− f0(z)(1+a)(2t −1)(R)(D+R)−1 > 0
for any d,r,D,R. Thus, the second derivative of the objective function of
party D is negative, i.e. the objective function of party D is concave. A
similar calculation shows that the objective function of party R is also con-
cave. 
We now prove a series of Lemmas leading up to the proof of Theorem
4.1.
Lemma 7.1. Assume F is uniform. Given any p−i, party i’s best response
policy choice is such that g(pi)+g(p−i)+G ≥ 0.
Proof. We focus on the problem solved by party D. The problem solved by
party R is entirely symmetric.
Weclaimﬁrstthat, givenanypolicychoicer bypartyR,thebestresponse
d∗ by party D cannot be such that g(d∗)+g(r)+G < 0 and d∗ ≥ 1/2. To
see this, recall that, from 3.2, if g(d)+g(r)+G < 0 then the unique secondPOLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 13
stage Nash choice of campaign spending is D = R = 0. Thus, the objective
function of party D can be written as
−F(−d+d2+r−r2)(g(d)+g(r)+G)+g(d)+G
over the interval {d : g(d) < −g(r)−G}. The derivative of the objective





Since g(d)+g(r)+G < 0 (by assumption) and g0(d) < 0, the derivative of
the objective function is strictly negative for any d ≥ 1/2.
Next, we claim that, given any policy choice r by party R, the best re-
sponsed∗ bypartyDcannotbesuchthatg(d∗)+g(r)+G<0andd∗ <1/2.
From the argument in the previous paragraph, the derivative of the objective











Note that g(d)+g(r)+G < 0 implies r +d > 1, which in turn implies
d −d2 −r+r2 > 0. Thus, a necessary condition for the derivative of the












This condition is not satisﬁed for any 0 ≤ d ≤ 1/2, given our parameter
constraints a ≥ 1/4 and 0 < b ≤ 1. 
Lemma 7.2. Assume F is uniform. Given any p−i ≤ 1/2, party i’s best
response policy choice is such that pi < 1/2.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 14
Proof. We focus on the problem solved by party D. The problem solved by
party R is entirely symmetric.
Using the previous lemma, we have that, given any policy choice r by
party R, the best response d∗ by party D cannot be such that g(d∗)+g(r)+
G<0. Recallthat, fromTheorem3.2, ifg(d)+g(r)+G≥0thentheunique
second stage Nash choice of campaign spending is given by E as deﬁned in
equation 7.2. Using the assumption that the cost function is isoelastic, we
have
Ec0(E) = (1+g)dE1+g.
Substituting in equation 7.2, we get
2(1+g)dE1+g = (1+a)(2t −1)h(g(d)+g(r)+G),
or equivalently















Using D = R = E and the previous expression for c(E), we get that the
objective function of party D in the ﬁrst stage of the game, anticipating
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as long as g(d)+g(r)+G ≥ 0. The derivative of this objective function












Now, suppose that, given some policy choice r ≤ 1/2 by party R, the
best response d∗ by party D is such that g(d∗)+g(r)+G ≥ 0 and d∗ >





(2t −1)h < 0.










G ≥ 0 and 1−F(−d∗+(d∗)2+r−r2)− 1+a
2+2g(2t −1)h < 0. Thus, Party D
is better off deviating to d = r, because 2g(r)+G > 0 and 1/2− 1+a
2+2g(2t −
1)h > 0 (using assumption 2.1). 
Lemma 7.3. Assume F is uniform. Given any p−i ≤ 1/2, party i’s payoff
is strictly concave in its own policy choice in the interval [0,1/2].
Proof. We focus on the problem solved by party D. The problem solved by
party R is entirely symmetric.
Suppose that r ∈ [0,1/2], and consider the problem of party D. For d ≤
1/2, we have g(d)+g(r)+G ≥ 0. Thus, for d ≤ 1/2, the second derivative

















+2g0(d)h(1−2d)≤0.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 16













































The left-hand side of this inequality is nonnegative for any d ∈ [0,1/2],
while the right-hand side is negative due to assumption 2.1. 
Lemma 7.4. If F is uniform, in equilibrium, 0 < min{d,r} < 1/2.
Proof. UsingLemma7.2, wehavethatmin{d,r}≥1/2impliesmin{d,r}>
1/2.
Suppose d = r > 1/2. Using assumption 2.1 and Lemma 7.1, we can
see that the derivative of the objective function of either party as given by
equation 7.4 is negative, a contradiction.

















































Since d > r and d +r > 1, we have −d +d2 +r−r2 > 0, which implies
F(−d +d2 +r−r2) > 1/2. Thus, the left-hand side is smaller than one.
However, d > r implies that the right-hand side is larger than one, a contra-
diction.
The case r > d > 1/2 can be dealt with similarly. 
Lemma 7.5. If F is uniform, in equilibrium, d = r < 1/2.






























Using the previous lemma, we only need to consider asymmetric equi-
libria satisfying d < r < 1/2 or r < d < 1/2. Consider the ﬁrst case (the
second case is similar). Then −d+d2+r−r2 > 0, which implies F(−d+
d2+r−r2) > 1/2. Thus, the left-hand side is smaller than one. However,
if d < r, then the right-hand side is larger than one, a contradiction. 
Theorem. 4.1 If F is uniform on [−a,a], there is a unique equilibrium, it










+(2g(p∗)+G)h(1−2p∗) = 0. (7.5)
The solution to this equation has 0 < p∗ < 1/2.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 18
Proof. Since F is assumed to be uniform on [−a,a], we have
f(−d+d2+r−r2) = h
for any d,r.
Lemmas 7.1 to 7.5 imply that in equilibrium d = r = p∗ < 1/2, where











which is equation 7.5 above.
To show that equation 7.5 has indeed a unique solution p∗ ∈ (0,1/2),
note that (2g(p)+G)h(1−2p) is continuous and strictly decreasing in p
for p ∈ (0,1/2), since g(p) > 0 and g0(p) < 0. Moreover, it takes the value











is continuous and strictly decreasing in p for p ∈ (0,1/2), since g0(p) < 0,
g00(p) < 0, and (by assumption 2.1) h(2t −1) < (1+g)/(1+a). More-
over, it takes the value g0(0)(1/2−(1+a)h(2t −1)/(2+2g)) for p = 0
and decreases without bound as p approaches 1/2 from the left, since g0(p)
decreases without bound as p approaches 1/2 from the left. Thus, a solution
p∗ ∈ (0,1/2) to equation 7.5 exists if and only if













tonicity, the solution must be unique. 
Theorem. 5.1 If F is uniform on [−a,a], the equilibrium policy position p∗
is independent of d, increasing in G,t and decreasing in a,g. Equilibrium


























From Theorem 4.1, p∗ is given by the solution to the equation
H(p,a,g,t,G) = 0
under the constraint 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2. Moreover, 0 < p∗ < 1/2. It is simple to
check that ¶H/¶p < 0 for 0 < p < 1/2 (see the proof of Theorem 4.1). The
comparative statics results for p∗ follow from taking derivatives of H with
respect to its arguments and employing the implicit function theorem.
With respect to campaign spending, from Theorem 3.2 and the deﬁnition





Since p∗ is independent of d, an increase in d can only be accommodated
by a corresponding decrease in E∗.












Recall that ¶p∗/¶G > 0. Since the right-hand side of the expression above
is increasing in p∗, it follows that 2g(p∗)+G is increasing in G. Then,
using equation 7.6, we get ¶E∗/¶G > 0.













































.POLICY PLATFORMS, CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 20
Thus the sign of ¶E∗/¶t is equal to the sign of the derivative with respect to











Thus, if targeting accuracy is very small (t close to 1/2), ¶E∗/¶t > 0. How-
ever, if targeting accuracy is large (t close to 1), it is possible that a further
increase in accuracy leads to a reduction in campaign spending.
As in the previous argument, the sign of ¶E∗/¶a is equal to the sign of
the derivative with respect to a of the expression in the right-hand side of




















This expression is proportional to the one in the statement of the theorem.
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